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CONSUMER PROTECTION-IMPLIED CIVIL
REMEDY UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSUMER
CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
John H. Stewart, an employee of The Travelers Insurance
Company, was discharged from his job following the garnishment
of his wages for a single indebtedness. Stewart alleged that he was
wrongfully discharged by Travelers in violation of section 1674 of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 19681 which forbids the
discharge of an employee for garnishment of wages resulting from
a single indebtedness.2 After the Department of Labor's refusal to
take action on the claim,3 Stewart brought a private action in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
seeking reinstatement, backpay, punitive damages, and attorney
fees. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Con-
gress did not intend that such private action be available under
Subchapter H of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The ruling
was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Cir-
cuit. Held, reversed and remanded. Where the express remedies in
Subchapter I of the Act fail to ensure the full effectiveness of the
congressional purpose underlying the statute, the implication of a
private remedy is necessary. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d
108 (9th Cir. 1974).
The central issue in Stewart was whether, in the absence of
express statutory provisions, a private civil remedy can be implied
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2 Id. § 1674(a) provides: "No employer may discharge any employee by reason
of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebt-
edness." Id. § 1674(b) provides: "Whoever wilfully violates subsection (a) of this
section shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year
or both."
Id. § 1676 provides: "The Secretary of Labor, acting through the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, shall enforce the provisions of this
subchapter."
Although section 1676 contains language making enforcement by the Secretary
of Labor mandatory, it also provides that the Act will be enforced by the Secretary
acting through the Wage and Hour Division. This Division, however, is subject to
regulation under the Fair Labor Standards Act that provides for discretionary
investigation and prosecution under 29 U.S.C. § 211(a). As a result of the ambigu-
ous provisions, overlapping regulatory statutes and agencies, and a shortage of
manpower in the Department of Labor, not all claims have been acted on by the
Secretary of Labor as would appear to be required under section 1676 of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act. Note, Federal Restrictions of Wage Garnishments:
Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 44 IND. L.J. 267, 280 (1968).
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under Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, even
though it provides only for criminal sanctions and administrative
enforcement by the Department of Labor. In answering this ques-
tion the court encountered a recurring problem-construing the
intent of Congress in drafting a federal regulatory statute, the
provisions of which are insufficient to resolve a particular case
arising under it.
The defendant's assertion that Congress did not intend pri-
vate civil remedies to be available under section 1674 was based
essentially on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, I
meaning that the express authorization of a remedy in one section
of a statute implies the exclusion of other remedies under the same
section. The defendant based this argument on the following facts:
(1) the passage of section 1674 was influenced by an analogous New
York statute containing a limited civil remedy, and the omission
of this provision in the federal statute indicated the intent of Con-
gress to exclude it; (2) prior to adopting the statute, Congress
debated whether to include a criminal penalty and did not propose
any civil remedy under Subchapter Hl;5 and (3) specific civil reme-
dies were provided in Subchapter I of the Act,' indicating an intent
to exclude these remedies in Subchapter II.
The court responded to each of these assertions. First, the New
York statute contained only a limited civil remedy not included in
the federal statute, indicating "at most that Congress did not want
a limited civil remedy provision." 7 Second, the congressional de-
bate over criminal penalties did not suggest a clear intent to ex-
clude civil remedies, and, third, the doctrine of expressio unius
should be limited "in favor of construing an act so as to effectuate
its dominant purpose."'
I The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a primary rule of
statutory construction and means generally that the enumeration of specific things
in a statute excludes those things not mentioned. It is a rule of construction, not of
substantive law, and is used to determine the legislative intent of statutes, ordi-
nances, and, to a lesser extent, constitutions. See Bloemer v. Turner, 281 Ky. 832,
137 S.W.2d 387 (1939); Whitehead v. Cape Henry Syndicate, 105 Va. 463, 54 S.E.
306 (1906); State ex rel. Battle v. Hereford, 148 W. Va. 97, 133 S.E.2d 86 (1963),
114 CONG. REc. 1839 (1968) (Remarks of Congressman Rogers).
I Section 1640 of the Act provides for a civil remedy against any creditor who
fails to disclose to the debtor any information required under the disclosure provi-
sions of Subchapter I of the Act.
7 503 F.2d at 111.
Id. at 112.
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The court found that the purpose of the Act was to protect the
individual employee from hardships resulting from wrongful dis-
charge,' the predicament of being unable to pay a debt while un-
employed and unemployment resulting from the inability to pay
a debt. 10 The Ninth Circuit determined that the administrative
and criminal remedies of Subchapter H did not provide maximum
enforcement of the Act. Although a deterrent effect was present,
the express remedies neither gave full effectiveness to the congres-
sional purpose nor corrected the harm the statute was intended to
prevent. Using the rationale expressed in Burke v. Compania Mex-
icana de Aviacion, 1 the court determined that it was free to imply
a civil remedy to effectuate the congressional purpose. It recog-
nized that a civil action for damages could arise by implication
when a statutory criminal penalty is inadequate to protect the
interests of a member of the class the statute intended to protect. 2
Several factors led the Stewart court to conclude that a pri-
vate civil action should be implied in a claim arising under section
1674. First, under this section no action can commence until an
alleged violation has occurred, that is, until an employee has suf-
fered damage from a wrongful discharge. If a violation of section
1674 could have been considered by the authorized federal agency
before damages were incurred, the need for a private civil remedy
would be diminished. Furthermore, any action taken by the Secre-
tary of Labor under section 1674 is discretionary 3 as well as being
subject to the inherent deficiencies of a large bureaucratic agency.
Second, compliance with the provisions of section 1674 would not
be unduly harsh on employers since an employee could be dis-
charged for subsequent garnishments of wages. Third, compliance
with section 1674 would serve the best interest of both employer
and employee since a credit-stricken employee would be given a
chance to relieve the debt and the employer would be saved the
time and expense of training a replacement. Finally, the provisions
of section 1674 do not require special knowledge of economics or
complexities of a particular industry; they are simple, clear, and
applicable to all employers and employees with little danger of
misinterpretation or unfair administration.
Id. at 113.
10 See Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title HI of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 383, 387 (1947).
" 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970).
12 Id. at 1033-34.
1 See note 3 supra.
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The manner in which the Stewart court interpreted these fac-
tors removed the traditional reasons" for not implying a civil rem-
edy in the absence of express remedies. More importantly, the
court laid the foundation on which to apply, in effect, the "social
policy approach" to statutory interpretation as adopted in J..
Case v. Borak. 5 Under the Borak analysis, the question whether
Congress intended to provide a private remedy was unimportant,
absent a clear mandate. The court's inquiry turns on whether a
private remedy should exist as a matter of social policy and, if so,
whether a remedy necessary to effectuate the congressional pur-
pose should be provided. Although the Borak analysis has been
criticized, 6 the Stewart court recognized that this approach was
necessary to obtain a satisfactory result and to give full effective-
ness to congressional purpose. The court was required to extend
the scope of the statutory provisions in order to imply a private
cause of action. To accomplish this, the court first had to overcome
traditional reasons for not implying a private remedy and then use
a method of statutory interpretation that has been labeled "judi-
cial activism" and improper judicial legislation.'7 In order to pur-
sue his cause of action, the plaintiff was required to individually
challenge a complex structure of interwoven federal agencies re-
" 503 F.2d at 112. When alternative remedies exist in a state statute, or under
the same federal statute, or where enforcement of a federal statute rests with an
administrative agency, the argument for implying a private cause of action is weak-
ened. The court determined, however, that the need for a private cause of action
in a section 1674(a) violation overcame the reasons for not implying a private
remedy.
15 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Plaintiff, owner of common stock in defendant com-
pany, sought to enjoin the proposed merger of Case and American Tractor Corp.
under section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act which did not specifically provide
for such private actions. The Court determined that since the purpose of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act was to provide broad remedial relief and to protect investors, the
availability of judicial relief in an individual private action should certainly be
implied to achieve that result. The Court upheld the plaintiff's right to bring a
private action and stated that it is the duty of the judicial system to provide such
remedies as are necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose.
11 The Borak rationale has been criticized under the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine which provides that when an administrative agency is created to regulate a
general area, and a cause of action arises in that area, the courts lack jurisdiction
to grant relief until the appropriate regulatory agency has determined the issues
involved. See, T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 472-74 (1959); Note,
Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. Rlv. 285,
295 (1963).
', Note, supra note 10, at 414.
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sponsible for enforcing a statute with provisions that were inade-
quate to resolve the dispute arising under it.
Well-drafted state consumer credit statutes could provide an
alternate solution to the problems encountered by the plaintiff and
the court in Stewart. If a state statute contains provisions on gar-
nishment that are "substantially similar""8 to those in the federal
act, the state statute will not be superseded. A plaintiff could then
bring his action under the state statute and have equal or better
remedies available than under the federal Act.
The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act 9 is an
example of a state statute with garnishment provisions that meet
the "substantially similar" test."0 It contains express provisions for
civil remedies following discharge of an employee for garnishment
of wages." A West Virginia employee discharged in violation of this
statute may bring a private action for damages without involving
the federal statute or any federal agency. This affords the em-
ployee a local forum and the likelihood that his claim will be more
quickly resolved. Although the West Virginia statute limits the
amount of damages recoverable," it is a significant alternative to
a wrongfully discharged plaintiff in a jurisdiction that does not
imply a civil remedy under section 1674 of the federal act.2
11 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (1970) provides:
The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt from provisions of
section 1673(a) of this title garnishments issued under the laws of any
state if he determines that the laws of that state provide restrictions on
garnishment which are substantially similar to those provided in section
1673(a) of this title.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-1-101 to -8-102 (1974 Replacement Volume).
Eleven jurisdictions have statutes that comply with the uniformity required
under section 1675 of the Act-Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
Note, Federal Restrictions of Wage Garnishments: Title LI of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 44 IND. L.J. 267, 289 & n.116 (1968).
21 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-101(6) provides:
If an employer discharges an employee in violation of the provisions pro-
hibiting discharge (§ 46A-2-131), the employee may within ninety days
bring a civil action for recovery of wages lost as a result of the violation
and for an order requiring the reinstatement of the employee. Damages
recoverable shall not exceed lost wages for six weeks.
n Id.
2 Three jurisdictions have not allowed a private civil action under section 1674
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194
(S.D.W. Va. 1973); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La.
1972), vacated and remanded, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973); Oldham v. Oldham,
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By implying a private cause of action under section 1674 of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Stewart afforded the wrongfully
discharged employee a greater opportunity for relief. Whether this
interpretation of section 1674 will be followed by other jurisdictions
is uncertain in light of other methods of statutory interpretation
including the expressio unius doctrine. The ultimate question
regarding the intent of Congress in drafting section 1674, however,
must be determined by Congress itself. Stewart may prompt legis-
lative action to specify the remedies available under Subchapter
II of the Act. Until then, a wrongfully discharged employee must
rely on state statutes, if available, or attempt to persuade local
federal courts to follow Stewart.
James D. Gray
337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972). But see, Nunn v. City of Paducah, 367 F. Supp.
957 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
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